Case 3:11-cv-01715-JCH Document 295 Filed 05/05/14 Page 1 of 51

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, and
STATE OF CONNECTICUT,

Case No. 3:11-cv-1715 (JCH)
The Honorable Janet C. Hall

Plaintiffs,
v.
LEANSPA, LLC, a Connecticut limited
liability company,

May 5, 2014

NUTRASLIM, LLC, a Connecticut limited
liability company,
NUTRASLIM U.K. LTD., also d/b/a
LEANSPA U.K. LTD., an United Kingdom
limited liability company
BORIS MIZHEN, individually and as an
officer of LEANSPA, LLC, NUTRASLIM,
LLC, and NUTRASLIM U.K. LTD.
LEADCLICK MEDIA, INC., a California
corporation, and LEADCLICK MEDIA, LLC,
as a successor limited liability company, and
RICHARD CHIANG, individually and as an
officer of LEADCLICK MEDIA, INC.,
Defendants, and
ANGELINA STRANO, and
CORELOGIC, INC., a Delaware corporation,
Relief Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
LEADCLICK DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Case 3:11-cv-01715-JCH Document 295 Filed 05/05/14 Page 2 of 51

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .........................................................................................1

II.

SUMMARY OF FACTS....................................................................................................3
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

LeadClick’s eAdvertising Division Operated an Affiliate Marketing
Network ...................................................................................................................4
The LeanSpa Defendants ......................................................................................5
The Use of “News Sites” in Affiliate Marketing..................................................7
LeadClick’s Software Platform ..........................................................................11
LeadClick’s Finances ...........................................................................................12

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW .............................................................................................13

IV.

ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................14
A.

B.

LeadClick is not liable for the allegedly deceptive advertising of
third-party publishers, under either the FTC Act or the CUTPA ..................14
1)

Liability under the FTC Act requires proof that the allegedly
deceptive advertising statements were made by or attributed
to the defendant ........................................................................................15

2)

The undisputed evidence—including the testimony of the
FTC’s own investigators—uniformly demonstrates that the
allegedly deceptive “news sites” used by third-party
publishers were created and used prior to any publisher
using them on LeadClick’s eAdvertising network and did not
attribute any representations to LeadClick...........................................22

LeadClick’s affiliate marketing program is a content-neutral
“interactive computer service” that is entitled to immunity under
Section 230 of the CDA ........................................................................................25
1)

LeadClick operated and used an “interactive computer
service” as defined by the CDA ..............................................................27

2)

The allegedly deceptive advertisements at issue were
provided by an independent “information content provider,”
not by LeadClick ......................................................................................28

3)

FTC seeks to treat LeadClick as the speaker of the allegedly
deceptive advertisements .........................................................................29

Page i

Case 3:11-cv-01715-JCH Document 295 Filed 05/05/14 Page 3 of 51

C.

V.

4)

Plaintiffs cannot circumvent CDA 230’s broad grant of
immunity by asserting that LeadClick was somehow
responsible for the “development” of the “news sites” at issue ...........29

5)

Neither knowledge nor profit motive is material to CDA
immunity ...................................................................................................33

The equitable monetary relief sought by the FTC is a type of
ancillary relief that cannot be awarded when an injunction is
improper, and the amount being sought does not—as it should—take
into account the funds that LeadClick was contractually obligated to
pass onto third parties .........................................................................................34
1)

Equitable monetary relief is improper where an injunction is
improper because it is an ancillary relief intended to help
make permanent relief possible ..............................................................34

2)

If the Court determines that some equitable monetary relief
is proper, the FTC can only recover the amount of money
that LeadClick received from injured consumers and was not
obligated to pass on to its publishers ......................................................37

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................39

ii

Case 3:11-cv-01715-JCH Document 295 Filed 05/05/14 Page 4 of 51

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Federal Cases
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144 (1970) .................................................................................................................14
Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist.,
963 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.1992)......................................................................................................14
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242 (1986) ...........................................................................................................13, 14
Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp.,
842 F. Supp. 2d 450 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) ...............................................................................28, 31
Asia Econ. Inst. v. Xcentric Ventures LLC,
2011 WL 2469822 (C.D.Cal. May 4, 2011) ............................................................................31
Assoc. Bank-Corp. v. Earthlink, Inc.,
No. 05-C-0233-S, 2005 WL 2240952 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 13, 2005).........................................26
Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc.,
603 F. Supp. 2d 690 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)......................................................................................26
Batzel v. Smith,
333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) .................................................................................................31
Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc.,
206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2003) .................................................................................................27
Black v. Google Inc.,
No. 10-02381 CW, 2010 WL 3222147 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 13, 2010) ..........................................31
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.,
339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) .....................................................................................27, 28, 32
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,
511 U.S. 164 (1994) ......................................................................................................... passim
Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,
519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008) ...................................................................................................26
Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. QIP Holders LLC,
No. 3:06-cv-01710-VLB, 2010 WL 669870 (D. Conn. Feb. 19, 2010) ............................27, 30

Page iii

Case 3:11-cv-01715-JCH Document 295 Filed 05/05/14 Page 5 of 51

Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc.,
540 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D. N.H. 2008) ........................................................................................33
Doe v. GTE Corp.,
347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003) ...................................................................................................33
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com,
LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) ............................................................................30, 32, 33
FTC v. Accusearch Inc.,
570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009) ...............................................................................................30
FTC v. Ameridebt,
373 F. Supp. 2d 558 (D. Md. 2005) .........................................................................................37
FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC,
654 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 2011).....................................................................................................38
FTC v. Circa Direct LLC et al,
No. 11-cv-02172-RMB-AMD (D. N.J. Apr. 16, 2011) ...........................................8, 29, 36, 39
FTC v. Febre,
128 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 1997) ...................................................................................................37
FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc.,
401 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2005) ...............................................................................................21
FTC v. Medical Billers Network, Inc.,
543 F. Supp. 2d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)..........................................................................21, 36, 37
FTC v. Ross et al.,
No. 1:08-cv-03233-RDB [ECF No 262] (D. Md. September 24, 2012) .................................37
FTC v. Verity Int’l Ltd.,
443 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2006).................................................................................................36, 38
Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc.,
No. 08 Civ. 7735 (RMB), 2009 WL 1704355 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009) ...............................27
Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC,
544 F. Supp. 2d 929 (D. Ariz. 2008) .......................................................................................31
Goddard v. Google, Inc.,
No. C-08-2738-JF (PVT), 2008 WL 5245490 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008) ..............................34
Kramer v. Time Warner Inc.,
937 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1991).......................................................................................................6

iv

Case 3:11-cv-01715-JCH Document 295 Filed 05/05/14 Page 6 of 51

M.A. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC,
809 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (E.D. Mo. 2011)....................................................................................34
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574 (1986) .................................................................................................................14
Mitan v. A Neumann & Assocs.,
No. 08-6154, 2010 WL 4782771 (D. N.J. Nov. 17, 2010) ......................................................31
Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc.,
261 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d, No. 03-1770, 2004 WL 602711
(4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2004) ...........................................................................................................26
Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP,
603 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2010).........................................................................................19, 20, 21
Perez v. Ahlstrom Corp.,
Order on Mot. to Dismiss [ECF No 10] Case No. 10–cv–1299, 2011 WL
2533801 (D. Conn. June 27, 2011) ..........................................................................................18
Ramey v. Darkside Prods., Inc.,
No. 02-730 (GK), 2004 WL 5550485 (D.D.C. May 17, 2004) ...............................................28
S. C. v. Dirty World, LLC,
No. 11-CV-00392-DW, 2012 WL 3335284 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 2012) .................................31
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,
106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939).......................................................................................................38
Swift & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 311 (1928) .................................................................................................................35
United States v. W.T. Grant,
345 U.S. 629 (1953) .....................................................................................................34, 35, 37
Universal Commc’ns Sys. v. Lycos, Inc.,
478 F. 3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007) .............................................................................................27, 33
Wright v. Ernst & Young, LLP,
152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998).........................................................................................19, 20, 21
Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP,
No. 97-9241, 1997 WL 563782 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1997) ....................................................20
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc.,
129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) .............................................................................................26, 27

v

Case 3:11-cv-01715-JCH Document 295 Filed 05/05/14 Page 7 of 51

State Cases
Cisneros v. Yahoo!, Inc. et al.,
No. CGC-040433518 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Dec. 10, 2008) .........................................................33, 34
Gentry v. eBay, Inc.,
121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703 (2002) ...................................................................................................32
Hill v. StubHub, Inc.,
727 S.E.2d 550 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) ......................................................................................33

Statutes
15 U.S.C. § 45 ................................................................................................................................21
15 U.S.C. § 53(b) .................................................................................................................3, 36, 37
15 U.S.C. § 78j...............................................................................................................................17
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) ..........................................................................................................................21
47 U.S.C. § 230 ..................................................................................................................26, 28, 32

Other Authorities
FED. R.CIV.P. 56(c) ........................................................................................................................13
FED. R. EVID. 201(b) ......................................................................................................................18

vi

Case 3:11-cv-01715-JCH Document 295 Filed 05/05/14 Page 8 of 51

I.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This is a non-jury deceptive trade practices lawsuit in which the only remaining

defendants are a defunct affiliate marketing network (LeadClick) and its parent company. The
operative complaint1 contains myriad allegations about the misleading advertising practices of
the LeanSpa2 defendants, who allegedly sold ineffective “weight-loss” products to consumers
through allegedly deceptive web-based “free trial” offers, using deceptive guarantees and refund
claims.3 But Plaintiffs’ claims against LeanSpa and its allegedly deceptive sales practices have
nothing to do with LeadClick.4 The sole claim Plaintiffs assert against LeadClick contends that
the company is somehow responsible for certain specific misrepresentations made by
independent third-party “affiliate marketers”—also called “publishers”—who used online “news
sites” to promote LeanSpa products.
In particular, Plaintiffs allege that LeadClick is responsible for two, and only two, aspects
of these “news site” advertisements in that the websites: a) purport to be legitimate news
websites; and b) contain comments that purport to express the views of real consumers.5 But
LeadClick had no involvement in the design or publication of these “news site” advertisements;
it neither made nor adopted any statement contained in any advertisement, and no statement in
any advertisement is attributed to or even mentions LeadClick. As a matter of law, LeadClick is

1

Third Amended Complaint (“Compl.”) [ECF No 246].

2

LeanSpa refers to LeanSpa, LLC, NutraSlim, LLC, and NutraSlim U.K., Ltd., and their owner,
Boris Mizhen.

3

Compl. at ¶¶ 73–81, 85–121, 129–143 (Counts 1–3, 5–12, 15–16).

4

LeadClick refers, collectively, to LeadClick Media, Inc. and its successor, LeadClick Media,
LLC.

5

Compl. at ¶¶ 82-84 (Count 4).

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
LEADCLICK DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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not responsible for the use of such websites by independent third-party publishers.
In resolving this motion, the Court need only address four straightforward issues. If the
Court finds in LeadClick’s favor on any one of the following issues, entry of an order granting
this motion for summary judgment in LeadClick’s favor is proper and no bench trial is necessary.
1)

LeadClick is not liable for a violation of the Federal Trade Commission

(“FTC”) Act or the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”). Under Second
Circuit law, a defendant may only be held liable for allegedly deceptive statements that the
defendant has either personally made or adopted. There is no “aiding and abetting” liability
under the FTC Act. All witnesses in this case—including the FTC’s own investigators—agree
that LeadClick neither created nor contributed to the “news sites” utilized by publishers who
were members of LeadClick’s eAdvertising affiliate network, that no claims in those
advertisements are attributed to LeadClick, and that the “news site” advertisements do not even
identify LeadClick. As a result, LeadClick cannot be liable under the FTC Act or the CUTPA.
2)

LeadClick provided a content-neutral software platform as an intermediary

between publishers and merchants, and is thus entitled to immunity under the
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (the “CDA”). The CDA immunizes
LeadClick from liability for the content of any of the “news sites” used by independent thirdparty publishers that joined LeadClick’s affiliate marketing network. The unrebutted testimony
of one of the nation’s leading forensic experts, together with the testimony of the creator of
LeadClick’s affiliate network software platform, conclusively demonstrates that LeadClick meets
the statutory definition of an “interactive computer service.” Thus, LeadClick is immune from
liability and cannot be held responsible for the allegedly deceptive content of any of the thirdparty publisher “news sites.”

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
LEADCLICK DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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3)

The monetary relief sought by plaintiffs is improper because LeadClick is

defunct. Pursuant to Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), the FTC’s enforcement
authority in federal court is predicated on the statutory language authorizing the agency to seek
permanent injunctions. The power to award equitable monetary relief is ancillary to the power to
enjoin and may not be used when an injunction is improper. LeadClick is a defunct company
that ceased operating in late 2011. There is no prospect that LeadClick will resume any
operations. Because a permanent injunction is improper as a matter of law, equitable monetary
relief is a legally improper remedy.
4)

Any monetary relief must be limited to disgorgement of retained funds.

Although restitutionary relief is based on gross revenues, a party cannot be ordered to repay
consumer funds that it was contractually required to disburse to others. Here, LeadClick was
contractually obligated to, and did, pay publishers millions of dollars more than it ever received
from LeanSpa, because LeanSpa failed to pay its obligations to LeadClick. Any consumer funds
LeadClick did receive from LeanSpa were long ago disbursed to publishers to whom
commissions were due. Notably, the FTC has already recovered million-dollar settlements in
independent lawsuits the agency filed against some of these publishers. Because LeadClick lost
over $5 million as a result of the publishers’ advertising of LeanSpa products through its
network, and because the company does not hold any consumer funds, restitutionary relief is
improper.
II.

SUMMARY OF FACTS
LeadClick Media, LLC is a subsidiary of CoreLogic, Inc., and is the successor to

LeadClick Media, Inc., the entity that operated the affiliate marketing network until the

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
LEADCLICK DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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company’s closure in September 2011. LeadClick’s affiliate marketing network was operated
through the company’s “eAdvertising” division. 6
A.

LeadClick’s eAdvertising Division Operated an Affiliate Marketing Network
Affiliate marketing is a very common practice of Internet-based advertising.

Affiliate marketing campaigns involve compensating individuals or other business entities
(commonly referred to industrywide as “publishers” or “affiliates”) for their marketing efforts
on behalf of online retailers (referred to as “merchants”) who sell goods or services to
consumers.7
Publishers advertise online in a variety of ways—email marketing, banner ads and
search-engine placement are all methods utilized by publishers to promote merchants’ products
to consumers. Likewise, publishers can and do create their own websites to promote merchants’
products. Regardless of the marketing technique employed by a particular publisher, a critical
element in all affiliate marketing is to provide a technical mechanism by which an interested
consumer’s “click” on a publisher’s advertisement can be tracked and routed to a merchant’s
website (“landing page”).8
An affiliate marketing network is a business that acts as an intermediary between
publishers and merchants. By having a variety of merchant offerings, an affiliate program allows

6

See Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement in Support of LeadClick Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (“Statement”) ¶ 1 [Balas Decl. ¶¶ 3-5; Livermore Dep. Ex. 1 (Decl.) at ¶ 2;
Zimmerman Decl. ¶¶ 4, 10]. All documentary evidence in support of the motion, the
memorandum of law, and the Statement are attached as exhibits to the Statement.
7

Statement ¶ 5. [Stroz Report ¶ 5; Prokop Dep. 12:7–17; Redmond Dep. 19:14–19; Chelew
Dep. 29:21–24, 51:18–21].

8

Statement ¶ 6 [Stroz Report ¶ 5; Prokop Dep. 76:12–17, 80:19–23; Olsen Dep. 25:14–16;
Redmond Dep. 34:17–35:1].

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
LEADCLICK DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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publishers to more easily find and participate in advertising for particular merchants. And by
having a pool of existing publishers, an affiliate program allows online merchants to reach more
publishers and thereby a larger audience. The affiliate network serves as the middleman
administering the relationship between merchants and publishers so that an interested consumer
viewing a publisher’s advertisement can be tracked and directed to a merchant’s website.9
The following illustration demonstrates how the LeadClick affiliate network operated to
direct online consumer traffic from publishers’ advertisements to merchants’ websites:

Illustration 1 10

B.

The LeanSpa Defendants

The LeanSpa defendants operated a series of websites at which they sold to consumers
purported weight-loss and colon-cleanse products under various brand names, including, but not
limited to, LeanSpa™, LeanSpa™ with Acai, LeanSpa™ with HCA, and LeanSpa™ Cleanse.

9

Statement ¶ 7 [Stroz Report ¶ 6; Chelew Dep. 27:18–20, 35:17–18, 51:19–21, 161:22–162:8,
280:20–281:10; 285:3–4; Prokop Dep. 12:13–17].
10

See Statement ¶ 8 [Prokop Dep. 81:21–84:3, Ex. 3].

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
LEADCLICK DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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LeanSpa sold its products through websites it owned and operated, including LeanSpa.com,
TryLeanSpa.com, and LeanSpaCleanse.com. LeanSpa also used numerous affiliate networks to
advertise its products and, in approximately October 2010, became a client of LeadClick. As a
result, publishers on LeadClick’s network were able to advertise for LeanSpa by running the
company’s advertising campaigns. LeadClick’s relationship with LeanSpa lasted six months,
ending in April 2011.11
LeanSpa allegedly sold its products to consumers through a “continuity” program.
LeanSpa purportedly offered consumers a “free trial” of the product; if a consumer did not
contact the company to cancel after receiving an initial supply of the product, the consumer
would receive product shipments at a cost of $79.99 or more every month.12 LeanSpa agreed to
pay LeadClick a set amount (between $35 and $45) for each online consumer who, having been
directed to LeanSpa’s webpage by a LeadClick publisher, enrolled in LeanSpa’s free-trial
program. Of this amount, approximately 85-90% was paid to the LeadClick publisher who
generated the particular consumer enrollment. LeanSpa was only one of numerous merchants
who used the LeadClick affiliate marketing network. Other LeadClick clients were merchants
who marketed various products and services, including insurance, teeth-whitening products,

11

Statement ¶¶ 9–10 [Mizhen Dep. 23:3–7, 24–24:4, 34:5–11, 139:5–18; 140:11-16; Davidson
Dep. 29:14–25, 59:1–20, 108:25–109:12; Chiang Dep. 131:17–19].
12

Statement ¶ 11 [Davidson Dep. 38:14–18, 65:20–66:1, 110:2–12; Chiang Dep. 113:7–13;
Chelew Dep. 110:2–15, 110:17–111:4; Schools Dep. Ex. 1 at 12 [ECF 11 at 13]]. The Court may
take judicial notice of the dates of the docket entries made in this case pursuant to Federal Rule
of Evidence 201(b) and (c). See, e.g., Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir.
1991) (“courts routinely take judicial notice of documents filed in other courts, … not for the
truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such
litigation and related filings.”).

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
LEADCLICK DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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beauty products, flowers, Christmas ornaments, and holiday cards.13
C.

The Use of “News Sites” in Affiliate Marketing

Long before any advertising relevant to this case took place, affiliate marketers were
using so-called “news sites” to advertise various merchants’ products. An example of one such
“news site” captured on September 30, 2010, is shown below:

Illustration 2 14
The origin of these “news sites” is unknown, but it long pre-dates any activity relevant to

13

Statement ¶¶ 12–13 [Chelew Dep. 281:14–16; Davidson Dep. 42:1–10; Chiang Dep. 179:12–
181:19; Olsen Dep. 115:16–116:12; Redmond Dep. 20:14–19].

14

See Compl., Exhibit A; Statement ¶ 13 [Davidson Dep. 178:11–20, Ex. 6, 180:17–181:24,
182:7–9; Schools Dep. 98:6–12].

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
LEADCLICK DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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this case.15 For example, the form of “news site” shown above was utilized by publisher Andrew
Davidson—through his company, Circa Direct, LLC (“Circa Direct”)—to advertise LeanSpa
products through affiliate network IMM Interactive, Inc. (a/k/a Copeac), not through
LeadClick.16 Davidson testified repeatedly and consistently that he copied “fake news” webpages
from other publishers.17 Any content on his webpages came from other pre-existing sites he
copied, not from LeadClick:
Q.

Now, is it accurate with regard to the fake news sites and especially the
fake news sites that dealt with the LeanSpa ads, is it accurate to say that
you were the person who copied these and created the content that shows
on your own site?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you didn't get that content from any networks and you didn't get it
from anyone at LeadClick, correct?

A.

Right.18

One of the FTC’s own investigators, Sallie Schools, confirmed Davidson’s testimony both in her
declaration and at her deposition. More than a year before LeadClick was sued in this case, Ms.
Schools examined the prolific use of these “news sites” across the web.19 She examined the
similarities between various “news” webpages, noted identical comments and photographic
images that appeared on many of them, ultimately finding over 33,000 web sites that shared the

15

Statement ¶ 13 [Davidson Dep. 180:17–181:24, 182:7–9; Schools Dep. 98:6–12; McKenney
Dep.15. Ex. 1(U) (Decl.) (bates nos. FTC-LS 000189–196)]
16

Statement ¶ 14 [Davidson Dep. 178:11–20, Ex. 6, Ex. 13 at 11]

17

Statement ¶ 17 [Davidson Dep. 19:23–20:10, 26:11–27:5, 179:21–180:5; Circa I Dep. 54:8–
55:4].
18

Id. [Davidson Dep., 179:21-180:5].

19

Statement ¶ 19 [Schools Dep. 27:19–32:8, Ex. 1 (Declaration of Sallie S. Schools, FTC v.
Circa Direct LLC et al, No. 11-cv-02172-RMB-AMD (D. N.J. Apr. 16, 2011)].

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
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same unique typographical error. Ms. Schools testified that her research demonstrated that the
“news sites” that advertised weight-loss products contain “nearly identical ‘comments’” from
purported consumers. She also testified that the substance of the comments “is virtually identical
across the various websites,” and that the comments on “news sites” promoting weight-loss
products are “substantially identical” to those appearing on “news site” advertisements
promoting products in other industries.20
Ms. Schools further explained that the images of the “health and diet columnists” used on
these advertisements “are stock photographs.” And she explained that her online research
showed that the identical image was used on various “news format websites” and on a Frenchlanguage website for a real estate developer. While Ms. Schools could not pin down precisely
how many times she saw the image, she agreed that she “saw it a number of times.”21 What she
was unable to discern through research was the origin of the format of these “news site”
advertisements, and conceded that the FTC has no information about where publishers may have
initially obtained the content for these pages:
Q.

Did you ever come to figure out where the format of this fake news site
originated?

A.

I don’t know where it originated.

…
Q.

But you don’t have any information then about how the affiliates who
were using this site got the content for it?

A.

I don’t have any information.22

It is undisputed that these “news sites” were created solely by third-party publishers, and

20

Statement ¶ 21 [Schools Dep. 94:7–97:16, Ex. 1 at ¶¶ 17-19].

21

Statement ¶ 22 [Schools Dep. 98:13–20, Ex. 1 at ¶ 20].

22

Statement ¶ 23 [Schools Dep., 98:6-24].

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
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were copied from sources completely unrelated to LeadClick. LeadClick was not in any way
involved in the creation, editing, or distribution of any “news site” advertisement used by its
publishers. The company did not provide any content for any “news site” and did not contribute
in any manner to any representations suggesting either that: a) objective news reporters have
performed independent tests demonstrating the effectiveness of the product featured; or b) the
comments following these “news reports” express the views of independent consumers.23 “News
sites” containing these characteristics—of supposedly objective news reports and associated
“comments”—were widely used in affiliate marketing by publishers long before any of them
were advertising for LeanSpa on the LeadClick network.24
LeadClick never provided publishers with any content or other creative material to be
used in any LeanSpa advertising campaign.25 And not only was LeadClick uninvolved with the
content of any of the publishers’ “news sites” (specifically those websites at issue that were
advertising LeanSpa products), but no “news site” contained any information that was publicly
attributed to LeadClick.26 A consumer viewing a “news site” and clicking on an advertised link
would have absolutely no awareness of LeadClick’s existence. Because all of LeadClick’s
activity—which consisted of managing the Internet traffic—was “behind-the-scenes,” the

23

Statement ¶ 24 [Davidson Dep. 19:23–20:10, 26:11–27:5, 179:21–180:5, 203:8–11, 204:3–7;
Circa I Dep. 54:8–55:4; Schools Dep. 14:20–24.; Chiang Dep. 177:13–178:20, Redmond Dep.
162:13–163:15; McKenney Dep. 173:19–25, 191:9–23].
24

Statement ¶ 25 [Davidson Dep. 178:24–179:8, 180:17–181:24, 182:7–9].

25

Statement ¶ 26 [Davidson Dep. 179:21–180:5, 203:8–11, 204:3–7; Chiang Dep. 177:13–25,
178:17–20; Schools Dep. 14:5–8].
26

Statement ¶ 26 [Davidson Dep. 191:16–18, Redmond Dep. 161:12–15; McKenney Dep.
191:9–23; Schools Dep. 14:20–24].
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affiliate marketing process was completely invisible to a consumer.27 Indeed, the FTC’s two
investigators in this case did not know anything about LeadClick or its operations at the time of
their depositions.28
D.

LeadClick’s Software Platform

LeadClick operated its affiliate network business by using the HitPath computer software
that it licensed from Webapps, LLC. (“WebApps”). HitPath operated on a server that WebApps
provided to LeadClick, which server also hosted the “eadvtracker.com” domain name designated
for LeadClick’s affiliate marketing network.29 It was this software platform that managed the
Internet traffic from interested consumers and directed them to the merchants’ websites. HitPath
provided software infrastructure services that enabled a consumer to click on a publisher’s
advertisement and be routed through LeadClick’s domain to an online merchant’s website.30
As shown above in Illustration 1, when an Internet user clicked on a link within the
publisher’s advertisement, the consumer was directed to the affiliate network, which in turn,
directed the consumer to the merchant’s website. In this manner, the affiliate network acted as
an intermediary to redirect the consumers’ Internet traffic to the appropriate merchant site.31
Visits to a merchant’s landing page were controlled by specific links embedded in publishers’
advertisements. LeadClick made available a link (or, more specifically, a URL) for each

27

Statement ¶ 28 [Davidson Dep. 191:19–22; Stroz Report ¶ 11; Prokop Dep. 21:15–21.

28

Statement ¶ 27 [Schools Dep.13:11-24; McKenney Dep., 191:9-23].

29

Statement ¶ 29 [Prokop Dep. 10:7–11:1, 82:6–12; Stroz Report ¶ 13].

30

Statement ¶ 30 [Prokop Dep. Ex. 3, 80:2–7, 81:9–84:3; Stroz Report ¶¶ 15–17].

31

Statement ¶ 31 [Stroz Report ¶ 12; Prokop Dep. 79:10–14, 80:2–7, 82:23–84:3; Chelew Dep.
35:17–18, 51:20–21, 161:22–23, 264:13–15, 280:24–281:7; McKenney Dep. 112:3–21, 113:21–
114:9].
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publisher that joined its affiliate network to use in its marketing efforts. That link directed an
Internet user to the network for financial-tracking purposes, and the user’s browser was then
redirected to the merchant’s landing page where the consumer could consummate a transaction.32
From a technical point of view—although invisible to the eyes of Internet users—an
affiliate marketing program manages communications and acts as an intermediary in the
following manner. First, when a consumer clicks on a link in a publisher’s advertisement, the
consumer’s browser is directed to a server operated by the affiliate network. The affiliate
network receives the incoming web traffic, uses the data in the communication, and redirects the
user’s web browser to the merchant’s website. This technical process is referred to as a
“redirect,” and its HTTP33 code is 302. It is the combination of these Internet communications
that allows the merchant’s site to be ultimately loaded into the consumer’s browser.34
E.

LeadClick’s Finances

Publishers that joined LeadClick’s eAdvertising affiliate marketing network were
compensated for sales or other actions taken by consumers who the publishers referred to a
merchant’s landing page. Each online consumer who was directed to LeanSpa’s landing page by
a LeadClick publisher and enrolled in LeanSpa’s “free trial” program was considered to have
completed an “action” for which publishers were entitled to payment. For LeanSpa campaigns,
LeadClick was obligated to (and did) pay its publishers somewhere around $40. This payment

32

Statement ¶ 32 [Stroz Report ¶ 8; Prokop Dep. 16:9–21, 39:23–40:1].

33

HTTP or Hypertext Transfer Protocol is a protocol to exchange information (hypertext) online
and is the foundation of communication on the World Wide Web.
34

Statement ¶ 33 [Stroz Report ¶¶ 3, 8–10; Prokop Dep. 81:21–82:12, 83:20–84:4].
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represented approximately 85 to 90% of the amount that LeanSpa promised to pay LeadClick.35
LeadClick was required to pay these amounts to publishers before receiving
corresponding compensation from LeanSpa. Although its standard written contract provided
LeadClick the option to pay commissions to publishers prior to receiving funds from merchants,
consistent with industry practice LeadClick had unequivocal oral agreements to pay publisher
commissions within seven to ten days after an action occurred, which was before receiving funds
from LeanSpa. LeadClick paid its publishers at least $5 million more than it ever received from
LeanSpa. Because LeanSpa went out of business owing LeadClick over $10 million, LeadClick
never received the funds to reimburse it for its payment of publisher commissions.36
LeadClick shut down its operations, including the operation of its affiliate network, in
September 2011.37
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This is a non-jury case. Summary judgment is appropriate when the record evidence

demonstrates that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”38 When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a
court must construe the facts in favor of the nonmoving party and must resolve all ambiguities

35

Statement ¶ 34 [Davidson Dep. 17:15–18:12, 41:22–42:10, 199:19–200:2; Chiang Dep.
179:12–181:19; Chelew Dep. 281:8–282:9].
36

Statement ¶ 35 [Chiang Dep. 180:4–181:19; Chelew Dep. 281:8–282:9; Davidson Dep.
200:10–201:9; Mizhen Dep. 127:7–12]
37

Statement ¶¶ 1, 35 [Balas Decl. ¶¶ 3-5; Livermore Dep. Ex. 1 (Decl.) at ¶ 2; Zimmerman Decl.
¶¶ 4, 10].

38

FED. R.CIV.P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, (1986).
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and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant.39 To constitute a “genuine” issue of
material fact, there must be contradictory evidence “such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the non-moving party.”40 Of course, in the case at bar, the Court itself, rather than a
jury, will make the factual determinations.
IV.

ARGUMENT
A.

LeadClick is not liable for the allegedly deceptive advertising of third-party
publishers, under either the FTC Act or the CUTPA41

The Complaint charges LeadClick with a violation of the “deceptive” provision of the
FTC Act; it alleges that the LeadClick Defendants, “directly or through affiliates acting on their
behalf and for their benefit have represented expressly or by implication” that certain websites
containing LeanSpa advertisements depicted objective news reports and independent consumer
comments that were neither objective nor independent.42 But the undisputed facts demonstrate
that LeadClick had no role whatsoever in creating or publishing these allegedly deceptive
advertisements, which were crafted and widely used by affiliate marketers long before those
publishers had any association with LeadClick. Nor are any of the representations in those
advertisements attributed to LeadClick.

39

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970); see also Aldrich v.
Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.1992).

40

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

41

The CUTPA, Connecticut General Statutes §§ 42-110a–42-110q, provides remedies for unfair
competition and false and/or deceptive advertising. The CUTPA specifically states at § 42110b(b) that “It is the intent that in construing subsection (a) of this section, the commissioner
and the courts of this state shall be guided by interpretations given by the [FTC] and the federal
courts to Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)), as from
time to time amended.” Thus, this motion will focus on cases interpreting the FTC Act.
42

Compl. at ¶¶ 32–34.
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As discussed more thoroughly below, under Second Circuit law, there is no “aiding and
abetting” liability under the FTC Act, and a defendant cannot be liable for allegedly deceptive
advertising unless it made the deceptive claims or such claims were attributed to it.
1)

Liability under the FTC Act requires proof that the allegedly
deceptive advertising statements were made by or attributed to the
defendant

The sole claim against LeadClick is premised upon the “deceptive” prong of FTC Act §
5(a)(1), which provides simply that “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce … are … unlawful.” Notably, no provision of the FTC Act authorizes the FTC to
pursue a claim for aiding and abetting another in committing an unfair or deceptive trade
practice, and no language in the statute discusses any type of secondary liability. As a result, the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A.,43 and its progeny in Second Circuit case law, strongly support the conclusion that
there is no legal claim for “aiding and abetting” a violation of §5(a)(1) the FTC Act, and that a
“primary violation” requires publication of or attribution within the deceptive advertising.
In Central Bank of Denver, the Supreme Court rejected a reading of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) that would have implied a cause of action for aiding
and abetting into §10(b) of the Exchange Act; he Supreme Court’s conclusion was unequivocal
and focused solely and squarely on the plain language of the statute:
If … Congress intended to impose aiding and abetting liability, we presume it
would have used the words “aid” and “abet” in the statutory text. But it did not.
We reach the uncontroversial conclusion, accepted even by those courts
recognizing a § 10(b) aiding and abetting cause of action, that the text of the
[Exchange] Act does not itself reach those who aid and abet a § 10(b) violation.

43

511 U.S. 164 (1994).
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Unlike those courts, however, we think that conclusion resolves the case. It is
inconsistent with settled methodology in § 10(b) cases to extend liability beyond
the scope of conduct prohibited by the statutory text. To be sure, aiding and
abetting a wrongdoer ought to be actionable in certain instances. The issue,
however, is not whether imposing private civil liability on aiders and abettors is
good policy but whether aiding and abetting is covered by the statute.44
This holding makes very clear that the analysis of whether the FTC Act—or any statute—creates
aiding and abetting liability should be determined by referencing the text of the statute alone.
Indeed, Central Bank of Denver goes on to explain that the statute must include an express
provision for aiding and abetting to authorize such a cause of action:
Congress has not enacted a general civil aiding and abetting statute—either for
suits by the Government (when the Government sues for civil penalties or
injunctive relief) or for suits by private parties. Thus, when Congress enacts a
statute under which a person may sue and recover damages from a private
defendant for the defendant’s violation of some statutory norm, there is no general
presumption that the plaintiff may also sue aiders and abettors.45
No court has yet considered how the Supreme Court’s holding in Central Bank of Denver affects
the construction of the FTC Act. The above-quoted text from Central Bank of Denver does
make clear, however, that the resolution of this inquiry depends heavily on the actual language of
the FTC Act. Because there are significant and relevant similarities between the FTC Act and
the Exchange Act, Central Bank of Denver precludes the FTC from bringing a claim under §
5(a)(1) on an aiding and abetting theory.§ 10(b) of the Exchange Act is the core anti-fraud
provision of the statute. At the time Central Bank of Denver was decided, § 10(b) provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange—
…

44

Id. at 177.

45

Id. at 182.
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(b)
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange Commission] may prescribe.46
Like the Exchange Act, the FTC Act broadly prohibits “deceptive” practices in its sphere of
regulation. Indeed, the language in the FTC Act is, if anything, less debatable: the only textual
argument the Supreme Court seriously considered in Central Bank of Denver was the effect of
the qualifying phrase “directly or indirectly” in § 10(b). Unlike the Exchange Act, the FTC Act
contains no such language.
Notably, the FTC has publicly acknowledged that it does not have the power to pursue
aiding and abetting claims under § 5. In Congressional testimony and correspondence after
Central Bank of Denver, the FTC, under both the Bush and Obama administrations, has steadily
acknowledged its inability to bring aiding and abetting claims under § 5(a)(1). In 2008, thenChairman of the FTC, William Kovacic, testified before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation in support of a proposal to amend the FTC Act to add an aiding and
abetting provision to § 5, which Congress ultimately rejected. Citing Central Bank of Denver,
Chairman Kovacic testified:
Since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994)...the Commission’s ability to pursue those
who assist and facilitate unfair or deceptive acts and practices has been
compromised. The Supreme Court’s broad reasoning in that case cast doubt on
the argument that Section 5 of the FTC Act could reach “aiding and abetting”
another person’s violation. Although the Commission has developed alternative
theories to reach secondary actors, these theories may make liability more
difficult to prove than if the FTC had specific statutory authority in this area.47

46

15 U.S.C. § 78j.

47

Prepared Statement of the FTC, S. Comm. On Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
William Kovacic (Apr. 8, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/
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Likewise, in 2009, Congress considered several amendments to the FTC Act in the
course of evaluating the laws that would ultimately result in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act. One of those laws, the Consumer Financial Protection Act, H.R.
3126 (111th Cong.), would have added an aiding and abetting provision to § 5. Then-Chairman
of the FTC, Jon Leibowitz, wrote to the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and
Commerce in support of the bill acknowledging that Central Bank of Denver precluded the
FTC’s exercise of aiding and abetting authority:
Until the 1994 Supreme Court decision in Central Bank of Denver … which held
that the SEC did not have aiding and abetting authority under the Exchange
Act, it was understood that the FTC had aiding and abetting authority under the
FTC Act. (The SEC's aiding and abetting authority was restored by statute shortly
after Central Bank of Denver.) Moreover, the FTC currently has aiding and
abetting authority under the Telemarketing Act, and we have used this
authority successfully to combat unlawful practices across a wide range of
products and services that are sold over the telephone. Extending aiding and
abetting authority to all deceptive and unfair practices would simply put all
channels of commerce on equal footing.
… Because of a lack of clear aiding and abetting authority, the FTC is not
always able to pursue all of the actors responsible for a fraudulent online
scheme.48
These statements from successive FTC Chairmen thus clearly acknowledge the demise of any
type of aiding and abetting liability under the FTC Act after Central Bank of Denver.
Following Central Bank of Denver’s elimination of secondary liability, the various circuit
courts took divergent approaches to defining the scope of a primary violation under the
Exchange Act. When first presented with the issue, the Second Circuit constructed what has

P034101reauth.pdf. See FED. R. EVID. 201(b); Perez v. Ahlstrom Corp., Order on Mot. to
Dismiss [ECF No 10] Case No. 10–cv–1299, 2011 WL 2533801, at *2 (D. Conn. June 27, 2011)
(noting that information on official government website is proper subject of judicial notice).
48

Letter from Hon. Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed Trade Comm’n, to H. Comm. On Energy &
Commerce (Oct. 26, 2009) available at http://goo.gl/2ZTm7V (emphasis added).
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been since termed the “bright line” test for a primary violation, which view the Court reaffirmed
in 2010.49 That same test should be utilized by this Court to examine the claim against
LeadClick under the FTC Act.
To find liability for a primary violation of the Exchange Act in the Second Circuit, this
“bright line” test prohibits a plaintiff from relying on statements conveyed to the public through
another source unless those statements are attributed to the defendant. In Wright v. Ernst &
Young LLP, the Second Circuit concluded that because reliance by those defrauded is an element
of a claim under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, the deceptive statements must have been publicly
attributed to the defendant to render the defendant liable for a primary violation of the statute.50
In Wright, the plaintiffs brought a private securities action against the auditing firm, alleging that
Ernst & Young had “provided false and misleading advice to [the underlying company],
knowing that the advice would be passed on to the investors.”51 Ernst & Young argued that it
had not made any public statements itself, and that the press releases made by the company, even
if they included false information that originated with Ernst & Young, made no references to it.
Ultimately, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case, explaining:
if Central Bank is to have any real meaning, a defendant must actually make a
false or misleading statement in order to be held liable under Section 10(b).
Anything short of such conduct is merely aiding and abetting, and no matter how
substantial that aid may be, it is not enough to trigger liability under Section 10(b)
…

49

Wright v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998); Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC v.
Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2010).

50

152 F.3d at 174 (“The Court [in Central Bank of Denver] further observed that authorizing a
§10(b) cause of action based on aiding and abetting would circumvent the ‘reliance’
requirement.”) (citing Central Bank of Denver, 511 at 180).

51

Wright, 152 F.3d at 172.
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In this case, [the company’s] press release did not attribute any assurances to
Ernst & Young and, in fact, did not mention Ernst & Young at all. Thus,
Ernst & Young neither directly nor indirectly communicated
misrepresentations to investors. Therefore, the amended complaint failed to
allege that Ernst & Young made “a material misstatement (or omission) on which
a purchaser or seller of securities relie[d].” … We therefore agree with the
district court that holding Ernst & Young primarily liable under the Act “in
spite of its clearly tangential role in the alleged fraud would effectively revive
aiding and abetting liability under a different name …52
In 2010, the Second Circuit reaffirmed the Wright rule and expressly disapproved
contrary precedent.53 In PIMCO, the plaintiffs brought a securities fraud action against the law
firm that represented a brokerage firm, alleging that the lawyer facilitated fraud by participating
in the creation of a registration statement, offering memorandum, and an IPO-registration
statement that all allegedly contained false information.54 Just as in Wright, none of the
documents at issue specifically attributed information to the law firm or attorney. The Court
reiterated the Wright rule, holding that a plaintiff must “rely on a secondary actor’s own
deceptive statements, and not on statements conveyed to the public through another source and
not attributed to the defendants.”55 The Court explained that:
An attribution requirement makes clear—to secondary actors and investors
alike—that those who sign or otherwise allow a statement to be attributed to them

52

Wright, 152 F.3d at 175 (quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added) (citing
Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 191; see Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, No. 97-9241, 1997
WL 563782, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1997).

53

See Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC. v. Mayer Brown LLP (“PIMCO”), 603 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2010).

54

Id. at149–50.

55

Id. at 155–56 (emphasis in original). In reiterating the “bright line” rule set forth in Wright, the
PIMCO Court rejected the “creator” standard proposed by both the plaintiffs and SEC. The
parties argued that the Wright public-attribution test should not be the only way to establish a
primary violation, that defendants who created the false statements on which others rely even
absent public attribution could still be primarily liable; but the Court rejected that proposed
“creator” standard.
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expose themselves to liability. Those who do not are beyond the reach of Rule
10b-5’s private right of action.56
In the Second Circuit, therefore, a defendant only commits a primary violation of § 10(b) by
crossing the bright-line test of making a misrepresentation that is publicly attributable to that
defendant. “Anything short of such conduct is merely aiding and abetting …”57
Here, where the FTC is seeking financial relief under § 13(b) of the FTC Act, a
“deception” claim under § 5(a)(1) of the FTC Act includes a reliance element just like a claim
under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act.58 Because reliance is an element of a claim under both §
10(b) of the Exchange Act and § 5 of the FTC Act, the public-attribution standard of Wright and
PIMCO applies to the FTC Act.59 Although the fact that consumers relied on a particular
misrepresentation is generally presumed in FTC Act cases if the misrepresentation was made
publicly and consumers purchased the product,60 that presumption neither extends to nor
addresses who made the representation relied upon.
The Second Circuit’s forceful adherence to the public-attribution requirement in the
Exchange Act demonstrates that, because of the similarities of the elements of the claims, a
primary violation of the FTC Act can likewise only be predicated upon a showing that the
deceptive conduct targeted—here the specific alleged misrepresentations in the “news sites”—

56

Id. at 156.

57

Id. at 157.

58

15 U.S.C. § 45; see, e.g., FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1205–06 (10th Cir.
2005) (collecting cases); FTC v. Medical Billers Network, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 283 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (citing Freecom Commc’ns, 401 F.3d at 1203 n.6).

59

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); PIMCO, 603 F.3d at 155–58 .

60

Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d at 1205–06.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
LEADCLICK DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Page 21

Case 3:11-cv-01715-JCH Document 295 Filed 05/05/14 Page 29 of 51

was publicly attributed to LeadClick. Any other standard would effectively revive aiding and
abetting liability under a different name.
2)

The undisputed evidence—including the testimony of the FTC’s own
investigators—uniformly demonstrates that the allegedly deceptive
“news sites” used by third-party publishers were created and used
prior to any publisher using them on LeadClick’s eAdvertising
network and did not attribute any representations to LeadClick

Acting only as an intermediary linking third-party publishers to online merchants,
LeadClick cannot be held liable for a violation of either the FTC or the CUTPA because it did
not create or publish any advertisements and nothing in those advertisements was attributed to
LeadClick.
LeadClick neither published the “news sites” nor contributed to their allegedly deceptive
format or content. Indeed, the precise “news sites” that form the basis of the FTC’s claims
against LeadClick had been created, published and widely promoted to the public long before
they were used to generate traffic on the LeadClick affiliate network. Perhaps the best example
of this fact comes from the FTC’s own Complaint. Exhibit A thereto (shown above in Part II.C
as Illustration 2) is the FTC’s quintessential example of an actionable “news site.” It purports to
be a legitimate news report, contains a photograph of “reporter” Julie Ayers, advertises the
LeanSpa Acai product, and describes the reporter’s claimed use of that product. But this website
has absolutely nothing to do with LeadClick. It was used by publisher Andrew Davidson before
his company, Circa Direct, was running any LeanSpa advertising campaigns with LeadClick.61
Davidson used the “news site” above-pictured at Illustration 2 to advertise LeanSpa’s products
through Copeac, a different affiliate network owned by another company unrelated to

61

Statement ¶ 14 [Davidson Dep. 178:11–179:8].

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
LEADCLICK DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Page 22

Case 3:11-cv-01715-JCH Document 295 Filed 05/05/14 Page 30 of 51

LeadClick.62 Not only did Davidson use this website format on the Copeac network, but he used
the same “news site” format on a variety of affiliate networks.63 Later, when Circa Direct began
running LeanSpa traffic on the LeadClick network, Davidson did not change the content of his
website:
Q.

And then when you switched running LeanSpa from this other network to
LeadClick, you didn't need to change the content of the site at all, the look
of the site or anything about the site, other than to simply change the link
so that the click would go to the LeadClick network instead of the network
you were running it on at the time?

A.

Right, yes.64

As Davidson testified, there was “nothing unique or different” about the “news sites” that
he utilized when he advertised for LeanSpa on the LeadClick network as compared with the
websites he used to advertise LeanSpa products (or other products for that matter) on other
affiliate networks.65
This fact is readily apparent from a side-by-side comparison of Davidson’s webpages.
As seen below in Illustration 3, Exhibit A to the Complaint (on the left) is a “news site” used by
Davidson to run LeanSpa traffic on the Copeac network before he ever started advertising
LeanSpa with LeadClick. And Exhibit C to the Complaint (on the right) is another “news site”
that he subsequently used to run a LeanSpa campaign on the LeadClick network. The latter is
identical in form and substance, purporting to be a legitimate news report and containing the
same photograph of “reporter” Julie Ayers.

62

Id.

63

Statement ¶ 16 [Davidson Dep. 178:3–6].

64

Statement ¶ 15 [Davidson Dep. 179:9–16].

65

Statement ¶ 16 [Davidson Dep. 178:3–10].
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Complaint Exhibit A

Complaint Exhibit C

Illustration 3
The FTC’s own investigator, Sally Schools, conclusively confirmed that the concept,
form and text of these “news sites” were created and widely used by publishers long before
LeadClick’s involvement with LeanSpa.66 Both Ms. Schools and FTC investigator Douglas
McKenney agree both that LeadClick was not involved in any way in the creation of the content
of these “news sites,” and that nothing in the sites attributes anything to LeadClick.67 Every
witness in this case—from independent third-party publisher Davidson to a former LeadClick
affiliate manager—confirms that LeadClick had no role whatsoever in the creation of these

66

Statement ¶ 19 [Schools Dep. 13:11–24, 38:13–17].

67

Statement ¶ 20 [Schools Dep. 14:20–24; McKenney Dep. 173:19–25, 191:9–23].
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“news sites.”68
Likewise, the “news sites” used by publishers in their marketing of the LeanSpa
defendants’ products indisputably contained no information identifying LeadClick. Indeed, a
consumer surfing the Internet and navigating through webpages would be completely unaware of
LeadClick’s affiliate network software operating in the background. The involvement of the
affiliate marketing network—the redirection of Internet traffic and the tracking of clicks and
sales—was all done “behind-the-scenes” and was wholly invisible to all consumers.
Because there is nothing about the design, content or attribution of these “news sites” that
is even remotely related to LeadClick, the company cannot be held liable for violation of the
FTC Act or the CUTPA.
B.

LeadClick’s affiliate marketing program is a content-neutral “interactive
computer service” that is entitled to immunity under Section 230 of the CDA

LeadClick is also immune from liability under Section 230 of the CDA. LeadClick’s
affiliate marketing software is a classic example of a content-neutral “interactive computer
service” that is entitled to statutory immunity for claims based on deceptive advertising
conducted by independent publishers. In this case, the FTC seeks to hold LeadClick liable for
the content on the “news sites” that it has conceded were designed, created and controlled by
third-party independent publishers who participated in LeadClick’s eAdvertising affiliate
marketing network.
The CDA states, in pertinent part, that “No provider or user of an interactive computer

68

Statement ¶ 24 [Davidson Dep. 19:23–20:10, 26:11–27:5, 179:21–180:5; Circa I Dep. 54:8–
55:4; Schools Dep. 14:20–24.; Chiang Dep. 177:13–178:20, Redmond Dep. 162:13–163:15;
McKenney Dep. 173:19–25, 191:9–23].
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service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.”69 It defines an “interactive computer service” as “any information
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer service, including specifically a service or system that provides
access to the Internet.”70 And the CDA defines “information content provider” as “any person or
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information
provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”71 Through the CDA,
Congress created a doctrine of federal immunity against “any cause of action that would make
service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.”72 The
CDA has been held to immunize interactive service providers from both state and federal causes
of action.73

69

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).

70

47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).

71

47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).

72

Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997). Courts in the Second Circuit
have recognized that the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Zeran represents the most widely accepted
interpretation of the CDA’s immunity provisions absent guidance from the this circuit. See, e.g.,
Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Chin,
J.).
73

See, e.g., Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d, No. 031770, 2004 WL 602711 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2004) (finding that AOL is immune from a federal
civil rights claim that treated it as a publisher); see also Assoc. Bank-Corp. v. Earthlink, Inc., No.
05-C-0233-S, 2005 WL 2240952 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 13, 2005) (Section 230 of the CDA precluded
a claim under the Lanham Act, Section 1125(a)); Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under
Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008) (Section 230 of the CDA immunizes
Craigslist against Fair Housing Act claims).
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Courts addressing the CDA have recognized that Congress intended the immunity
provision to be construed broadly.74 In determining whether a particular defendant is entitled to
CDA immunity, “[c]ourts engage in a three-party inquiry … i.e. [i] whether Defendant is a
provider of an interactive computer service; [ii] if the postings at issue are information provided
by another information content provider; and [iii] whether Plaintiff’s claims seek to treat
Defendant as a publisher or speaker of third party content.”75 If a defendant meets all three of
those elements, and if no other exception applies, that defendant is immune from liability under
the protections of the CDA.76 LeadClick meets the test and is entitled to the broad statutory
immunity of the CDA.
1)

LeadClick operated and used an “interactive computer service” as
defined by the CDA

As described above, courts interpret very broadly the CDA definition of an interactive
computer service as “any information service, system, or access software provider that provides

74

See Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7735 (RMB), 2009 WL 1704355, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
June 15, 2009) (“Courts across the country have repeatedly held that the CDA’s grant of
immunity should be construed broadly”) (internal citations omitted); see also Universal
Commc’ns Sys. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F. 3d 413, 418 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Zeran, 129 F. 3d at 330–
31) (interpreting CDA immunity “to effectuate Congress’s ‘policy choice … not to deter harmful
online speech through the … route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as
intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious messages”); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com,
Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2003) (“reviewing courts have treated § 230(c) immunity
as quite robust, adopting a relatively expansive definition of ‘interactive computer service’ and a
relatively restrictive definition of ‘information content provider’”); Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v.
Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985 n.3 (10th Cir. 2003).
75

Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. QIP Holders, LLC, No. 3:06-cv-01710-VLB, 2010 WL 669870 (D.
Conn. Feb. 19, 2010) (citation omitted).

76

See id.; see also Lycos, 478 F. 3d at 418.
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or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server.” 77 The operation of
LeadClick’s affiliate marketing network is described in great detail in the accompanying Local
Rule 56(a)(1) Statement of Undisputed Facts (see ¶¶ 29–33), above in Part II.D and in
Illustration 1 (see supra at Part II.A). In sum, LeadClick operated an affiliate marketing software
platform that managed Internet communications between consumers clicking on publisher
advertisements and online merchants.
The unrebutted analysis of one the country’s leading forensic experts, Stroz Friedberg
LLC, conclusively demonstrates that LeadClick’s affiliate marketing network platform meets the
definition of an “interactive computer service” by enabling innumerable consumers to access its
own computer server, as well as the computer servers of merchants. That conclusion was
confirmed by the founder and CEO of WebApps and the developer of the HitPath software
system. As a result, LeadClick qualifies as a “provider or user of an interactive computer
service” entitled to CDA immunity.
2)

The allegedly deceptive advertisements at issue were provided by an
independent “information content provider,” not by LeadClick

Section 230 of the CDA defines and courts have narrowly interpreted “information
content provider” as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation
or development” of the statements at issue.78 In this instance, as described above, Plaintiffs’
claims are based on just two specific portions of the “news site” contents: first, that the websites

77

47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2); See Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d 450, 473
(E.D.N.Y. 2011); Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123–24 .

78

47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3); see, e.g., Ramey v. Darkside Prods., Inc., No. 02-730 (GK), 2004 WL
5550485, at *7 (D.D.C. May 17, 2004) (discussing that courts adopt a “relatively restrictive
definition of ‘information content provider’” in the context of the CDA).
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purport to be legitimate “news sites” when they in fact are not actual news websites; and second,
that the websites contain a comment section that purports to be comprised of real comments
when the comments are not actually real.79 But the evidence supports that the publishers—rather
than LeadClick—were responsible for creating, copying, and publishing all of the content in
these websites. And the FTC conceded—as far back as April 2011, more than a year before
suing LeadClick—that third-party “information content providers,” not LeadClick—were
responsible for those two allegedly deceptive aspects of the “news sites.”80
3)

FTC seeks to treat LeadClick as the speaker of the allegedly deceptive
advertisements

There is no doubt that Plaintiffs’ claims seek to treat LeadClick as “a publisher or speaker
of third party content;” the Complaint is clear on this point. Plaintiffs allege that “the LeadClick
Defendants, directly or through affiliates acting on their behalf and for their benefit have
represented expressly or by implication” that certain websites containing LeanSpa
advertisements contained objective news reports and independent consumer comments that were
neither objective nor independent.81
4)

Plaintiffs cannot circumvent CDA 230’s broad grant of immunity by
asserting that LeadClick was somehow responsible for the
“development” of the “news sites” at issue

Plaintiffs cannot circumvent CDA 230’s broad grant of immunity by asserting that
LeadClick was responsible for the “development” of the “news sites” and was, therefore, itself
an information content provider. Although this Court previously denied LeadClick’s motion to

79

Compl. at ¶¶ 82–84 (Count 4).

80

Statement ¶ 13 [Declaration of Sallie S. Schools, FTC v. Circa Direct LLC et al, No. 11-cv02172-RMB-AMD (D. N.J. Apr. 16, 2011) [ECF No 3-5] bates nos. FTC-0392–0427[.
81

Compl. at ¶ 82.
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dismiss because the Complaint allegations suggested that such a claim was “plausible,”82
discovery in the case has proven otherwise.
Courts analyzing Section 230 immunity have held that defendants “develop” content only
if they either directly participate in creating the specific content that is alleged to be unlawful or
require users to provide the allegedly unlawful content.83 Liability cannot be based on a theory
that LeadClick somehow encouraged, monitored or acquiesced in publishers’ use of deceptive
advertising because such theories would “cut the heart out of Section 230.”84
In Roommates.com, the Court held that a defendant “helps to develop unlawful content,
and thus falls within the exception to Section 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged
illegality of the content.”85 Roommates.com was found to have “developed” content because it
specifically authored questions that elicited discriminatory preferences and required users of the
service to answer those questions.86 In the same vein, the Court in Doctor’s Assocs. II denied
summary judgment application of CDA 230 because a jury might believe plaintiff’s assertion
that Quiznos was “soliciting disparaging material” and “shaping the eventual content” of the
actionable representations.87 But here, it is undisputed that the allegedly actionable content in the
“news sites” was created long before any involvement by LeadClick.
Even if a fact finder could conclude that LeadClick knew about and encouraged

82

See Ruling re: Motions to Dismiss dated January 29, 2013 [ECF No 198] at 11.

83

Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1174
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009).

84

Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174.

85

Id. at 1168.

86

Id. at 1166.

87

Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. No. 06-cv-1710, 210 WL at *47.
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publishers’ use of “news sites,” LeadClick would still be immune. As one Court has stated, there
is “simply no authority for the proposition that encouraging the publication of defamatory
content” makes a defendant responsible, in whole or in part, for the “creation or development” of
that content.88
Similarly, any recommendations that LeadClick's personnel may have made about
product pairing—suggesting which merchant products should be placed together on a publisher’s
website for sales efficacy—do not relate at all to the allegedly deceptive content that already
existed on these “news sites” and cannot impact CDA immunity. A defendant does not lose CDA
immunity by altering or adding non-actionable content or enhancing a site’s commercial
prominence and visibility to online consumers.89
Rather, CDA immunity is lost only if a defendant was involved in the creation of the

88

Ascentive, LLC, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 473. Accord Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 562
(N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (“the fact that a website acted in such a manner as to encourage the
publication of unlawful material does not preclude a finding of immunity pursuant to [Section]
230”); Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 933 (D. Ariz.
2008) (holding that the ripoffreport.com website was not an information content provider even
though it allegedly encouraged defamatory reviews by others for its financial benefit); S. C. v.
Dirty World, LLC, No. 11-CV-00392-DW, 2012 WL 3335284, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 2012)
(“As a matter of law, and even if true, encouraging defamatory posts is insufficient to defeat
CDA immunity”).

89

Mitan v. A Neumann & Assocs., No. 08-6154, 2010 WL 4782771 (D. N.J. Nov. 17, 2010)
(defendant that added non-defamatory language to an allegedly defamatory email before
forwarding to others was protected by CDA 230); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir.
2003) (minor alterations and editing); Asia Econ. Inst. v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, 2011 WL
2469822, at *6 (C.D.Cal. May 4, 2011) (citing Black v. Google Inc., No. 10-02381 CW, 2010
WL 3222147, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 13, 2010)) (defendant consumer report website's deliberate
manipulation of webpage code to make certain reports more visible in online search results was
immune under Section 230 because “[a]bsent a changing of the disputed reports’ substantive
content that is visible to consumers, liability cannot be found”").
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precise content that is alleged to be actionable.90 Any broader interpretation of the term
“develop” would wrench the meaning out of Section 230:
It's true that the broadest sense of the term ‘develop’ could include the functions
of an ordinary search engine—indeed, just about any function performed by a
website. But to read the term so broadly would defeat the purposes of section 230
by swallowing up every bit of the immunity that the section otherwise provides.91
Stripping affiliate network operators of CDA immunity by holding them responsible for
“developing” publisher content would contravene the express policy statement proclaiming the
United States’ desire “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists
for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State
regulation.”92 What the Ninth Circuit cautioned against for websites applies even more aptly to
affiliate networks:
Websites are complicated enterprises, and there will always be close cases where
a clever lawyer could argue that something the website operator did encouraged
the illegality. Such close cases, we believe, must be resolved in favor of
immunity, lest we cut the heart out of section 230 by forcing websites to face
death by ten thousand duck-bites, fighting off claims that they promoted or
encouraged—or at least tacitly assented to — the illegality of third parties. Where
it is very clear that the website directly participates in developing the alleged
illegality — as it is clear here with respect to Roommate's questions, answers and
the resulting profile pages—immunity will be lost. But in cases of enhancement
by implication or development by inference—such as with respect to the
“Additional Comments” here—section 230 must be interpreted to protect
websites not merely from ultimate liability, but from having to fight costly and

90

Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1125 (even if matchmaking site contributed to structure and content,
immunity would still bar claim unless defendant “created or developed the particular information
at issue”); Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 717 n. 11 (2002) (eBay’s delivery of nonactionable content “is irrelevant if eBay did not itself create or develop the content for which
appellants seek to hold it liable”).

91

Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167.

92

47 U.S.C. §230(b)(2).
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protracted legal battles.93
5)

Neither knowledge nor profit motive is material to CDA immunity

LeadClick’s general knowledge about publishers’ use of “news sites” to advertise
products online utilizing affiliate marketing programs also does not destroy its CDA immunity.
Whether LeadClick had specific knowledge about its publishers’ allegedly deceptive advertising
likewise has no bearing on LeadClick’s entitlement to immunity:
It is, by now, well established that notice of the unlawful nature of the information
provided is not enough to make it the service provider's own speech. We confirm
that view and join the other courts that have held that Section 230 immunity
applies even after notice of the potentially unlawful nature of the third-party
content.94
Courts have been unequivocal in ruling that knowledge of deceptive conduct is irrelevant to the
question of CDA immunity.95
Likewise, the fact that LeadClick sought (albeit unsuccessfully) to make a profit is
irrelevant to CDA immunity. That an entity “operates a commercial business or makes a profit
has no relevance to the immunity determination.”96 Numerous courts have found interactive
computer services to be entitled to CDA immunity where the websites were operating as part of a

93

Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d at 1174–75.

94

See also Lycos, Inc., 478 F. 3d at 420.

95

See id.; StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 560 (holding ticket exchange website immune under Section
230 notwithstanding plaintiff's allegations that it knew of or encouraged ticket scalping in
violation of state law); Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 306 (D. N.H.
2008) (citing Universal, 478 F. 3d 413, 420) (internal citation omitted) (“‘notice of the unlawful
nature of the information provided is not enough to make it the service provider’s own speech’
under § 230”); Cisneros v. Yahoo!, Inc. et al., No. CGC-040433518, at *12 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Dec.
10, 2008), available at http://goo.gl/b7JWNK (citing Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 658 (7th
Cir. 2003) (whether entities know about the information’s content is irrelevant to the application
of Section 230).
96

StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d at 560.
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for-profit business.97 And courts have gone further to opine that not only can interactive
computer services operate a for-profit business and still retain CDA immunity, but it may also
take actions to try and increase its profits, including “instructing posters of ads on how to best
increase the impact of those ads” without defeating immunity.98
LeadClick is indisputably entitled to CDA immunity. The company was a “provider or
user” of an “interactive computer service” but Plaintiffs are seeking to hold LeadClick liable for
the content of “news sites” that they concede were created, copied, and hosted by independent,
third-party publishers. Nothing LeadClick is alleged to have done, whether possessing
knowledge about the allegedly deceptive practices of its publishers or operating what it intended
to be a for-profit business, removed it from eligibility for CDA immunity.
C.

The equitable monetary relief sought by the FTC is a type of ancillary relief
that cannot be awarded when an injunction is improper, and the amount
being sought does not—as it should—take into account the funds that
LeadClick was contractually obligated to pass onto third parties
1)

Equitable monetary relief is improper where an injunction is
improper because it is an ancillary relief intended to help make
permanent relief possible

As clearly articulated in United States v. W.T. Grant, 99 “[t]he purpose of an injunction is

97

Goddard v. Google, Inc., No. C-08-2738-JF (PVT), 2008 WL 5245490, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
17, 2008) (“the fact that a website elicits online content for profit is immaterial; the only relevant
inquiry is whether the interactive service provider ‘creates’ or ‘develops’ that content.”)
(citations omitted); Cisneros, No. CGC-040433518, at *12 available at http://goo.gl/b7JWNK
(“the fact that defendants’[sic] made money from selling internet access to sponsored sites [is]
irrelevant to the application of Section 230”).
98

M.A. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1050 (E.D. Mo. 2011) (“The
complained-of actions taken by [defendant] to increase the revenues it derives from its website,
e.g., touting its website as a ‘highly tuned marketing site’ and instructing posters of ads on how
to best increase the impact of those ads, does not defeat § 230 immunity”).
99

345 U.S. 629, 633–35 (1953).
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to prevent future violations.”100 Although it is possible for an injunction to be utilized “without a
showing of past wrongs … the moving party must satisfy the court that the relief is needed.”101
To demonstrate that an injunction is necessary, the moving party must prove that “there exists
some cognizable danger of recurrent violation, something more than the mere possibility which
serves to keep the case alive.”102
The circumstances of this case unequivocally demonstrate that there is no basis for
issuing an injunction against the single remaining corporate conduct defendant. LeadClick
Media, Inc., which ran the LeadClick affiliate network, was shut down in 2011 and does not even
exist as an entity. It was among a set of entities that had been acquired, and which through
various corporate transactions, became a subsidiary of CoreLogic, Inc. (“CoreLogic”).
CoreLogic is a reputable publicly traded company and leading global property information,
analytics and data-enabled services provider. CoreLogic’s management shut down LeadClick’s
operations on September 30, 2011, and terminated its employees—more than two and a half
years ago and 10 months before LeadClick was added to this lawsuit.103
In December 2011, the non-operational LeadClick Media, Inc. was transformed into
LeadClick Media, LLC, a California limited liability company, which remains a non-operational
subsidiary of CoreLogic. LeadClick Media, LLC has never had any operations. LeadClick
Media, LLC never operated an affiliate marketing network, and there is no prospect that it will

100

Id. at 633 (citing Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 326 (1928)).

101

Id.

102

Id.

103

Statement ¶¶ 1-2 [Balas Decl. ¶¶ 2-4].
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ever, in any way, become involved with publishers using “news sites.”104 There is no possible
basis for enjoining the activities of LeadClick Media, LLC.
Rather, the FTC has already obtained all necessary and appropriate injunctive relief in
this case. It has entered into stipulated injunctions with the LeanSpa defendants [ECF No. 274],
with the former manager of LeadClick’s affiliate marketing program, defendant Richard Chiang
[ECF No. 286], and with publisher Andrew Davidson and his company Circa Direct.105 Any
further injunctive relief is both unnecessary and unwarranted.
Because there is no prospect of future activity by the sole remaining defendant in this
case, the FTC cannot establish that an injunction is needed. As a result, no other equitable relief
can be granted and this entire case must be resolved in favor of LeadClick because it is outside
the scope of the FTC’s enforcement power under 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
The FTC’s federal court enforcement and litigation authority is predicated solely on the
language in § 53(b) providing that “in proper cases the Commission may seek, and after proper
proof, the court may issue, a permanent injunction.”106 Numerous courts have held that the
FTC’s power to enjoin includes any other ancillary equitable relief necessary to effectuate the
exercise the exercise of powers granted under § 13(b).107 “The power to grant ancillary relief

104

Statement ¶ 3 [Balas Decl. ¶¶ 5-6].

105

Statement ¶ 38 [FTC v. Circa Direct, LLC, et al., Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for
Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, Case 1:11-cv-02172-RMB-AMD [ECF No
55], October 17, 2011, available online at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/10/121019 circastiporder.pdf ]

106

15 U.S.C. § 53(b).

107

See FTC v. Medical Billers, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 323–324 (citing FTC v. Verity Int’l Ltd., 443
F.3d 48, 66 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits had
concluded that § 13(b) permitted restitution or other ancillary equitable relief).
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includes the power to order repayment of money for consumer redress as restitution or
rescission.”108 But the power to order repayment of funds for consumer redress is a type of
ancillary relief; accordingly, where an injunction is improper, such ancillary relief is also
improper.109 Because § 13(b) “has been interpreted as granting a court the authority to order a
defendant to pay restitution as ancillary relief to effectuate a permanent injunction,” where there
is no permanent to be effectuated, monetary relief is improper.110
This case is the rare case that is not a “proper case[]”111 under the FTC Act because it fails
the test for the propriety of a permanent injunction under United States v. W.T. Grant.112 Without
an appropriate permanent injunction, the FTC’s ability to seek equitable monetary relief likewise
vanishes. Accordingly, in this case, the FTC’s request for monetary relief should be dismissed.
2)

If the Court determines that some equitable monetary relief is proper,
the FTC can only recover the amount of money that LeadClick
received from injured consumers and was not obligated to pass on to
its publishers

Assuming arguendo that equitable monetary relief is proper—which it is not—the FTC
can only recover as equitable monetary relief the amount of money that LeadClick retained from

108

FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 1997); see also FTC v. Ameridebt, 373 F. Supp. 2d
558, 563 (D. Md. 2005).

109

See e.g., See also FTC v. Ross et al., No. 1:08-cv-03233-RDB [ECF No 262] (D. Md.
September 24, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/
2012/10/121002winfixeropinion.pdf. In FTC v. Ross, the district court explained that “As a
permanent injunction can be imposed on Ms. Ross, she may also be liable for monetary
damages,” id. (emphasis added), suggesting that if a permanent injunction cannot be imposed on
a party, the party may not also be liable for monetary damages.
110

FTC v. Medical Billers Network, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d at 323–324 (citing FTC v. Febre, 128
F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added)).

111

15 U.S.C. § 53(b).

112

United States v. W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. 629 (1953).
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its affiliate network activities, namely the amount received from LeanSpa and not distributed to
LeadClick’s publishers. However, that amount is zero. In fact, LeadClick lost millions of
dollars in its operation of its affiliate marketing for LeanSpa advertising campaigns. LeadClick
was victimized by LeanSpa’s refusal to pay its bills, and LeadClick wound up paying its
publishers over $5 million more than it ever received LeanSpa.
Under applicable Second Circuit law, appropriate restitution is based on a defendant’s
gross receipt of consumer funds but must not include revenue that the defendant was
contractually obligated to pass on to others.113 This rule, recently acknowledged in FTC v.
Bronson Partners, LLC,114 was first established in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.115
As the Bronson Court described:
In Sheldon, the defendants contracted to share a set percentage of their profits
with a third party. Our Court found that the defendants’ unjust gains did not
include the profits they were contractually obligated to pass on to the third party
… [and held that “t]he payments were never profits of the defendants at all; the
contracts effectively laid hold of them the moment they came into existence”…116
In light of this “unusual profit-sharing arrangement,” the defendant could not be required to
return consumer funds that had been contractually passed on to others, and which were no longer
in its possession.
This case presents an identical situation: LeadClick agreed to pay its publishers a set

113

FTC v. Verity, 443 F.3d at 67–69 (the “appropriate measure for restitution is the benefit
unjustly received by the defendants”); FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359, 375 n.10
(2d Cir. 2011) (noting vitality of Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.
1939)).

114

Id.

115

106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939).

116

654 F.3d 359, 375 n.10 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Sheldon, 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939)).

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
LEADCLICK DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Page 38

Case 3:11-cv-01715-JCH Document 295 Filed 05/05/14 Page 46 of 51

amount for each referred online consumer who enrolled in LeanSpa’s online promotion.
LeadClick was obligated to pay, and did indeed pay, its publishers on a quick turnaround—
typically within 7 to 10 days of the consumer’s enrollment.117 This distribution was usually
significantly before LeadClick received payment from LeanSpa.118 Although the payment
protocol left LeadClick at financial risk, it was standard in the industry.119
To LeadClick’s great distress, LeanSpa never fulfilled its obligations. LeanSpa failed to
pay LeadClick at least $10 million due for affiliate advertising. Although LeadClick did receive
some funds from LeanSpa, by the time LeadClick went out of business, the company had paid to
its publishers over $5 million more than it collected from the LeanSpa advertising.120 In sum,
LeadClick has not retained any consumer funds that can be the basis of equitable restitution.
V.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should find that (1) LeadClick is not liable under

either the FTC Act or the CUTPA, and (2) that any such liability is precluded by the immunity
granted to LeadClick by CDA Section 230. If it reaches the question of relief, the Court should
determine (3) that Plaintiffs’ request for monetary relief is legally improper and, (4) that
Plaintiffs cannot seek recovery of consumer funds contractually disbursed to others.

117

Statement ¶ 35

118

Statement ¶ 35

119

Statement ¶ 35

120

Notably, the FTC is fully aware that these funds have been contractually delivered to the
affiliate marketers, and has sought and obtained disgorgement of these funds in independent
legal proceedings. See e.g., FTC v. Circa Direct, LLC, et al., Stipulated Final Judgment and
Order for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, Case 1:11-cv-02172-RMB-AMD
[ECF No 55], October 17, 2011, available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
cases/2012/10/121019circastiporder.pdf (stipulated settlement amount of $11,500,000.00). The
agency cannot be allowed a second recovery in this action.
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